qulogic/pidgin

Manual merge changes from the release-2.x.y branch into default.

- Easy change in certificate.h (conflict with new doc style).
- Easy change in ssl-gnutls.c (keep my huge debug statement and comment
from 2.x.y)
- I didn't copy any changes from de.po. I always assume translation changes
should not be propagated between the release-2.x.y branch and default.
Translators are responsible for updating both of their translation files
as desired.
- I completely dropped datallah's change to certificate.c from
https://hg.pidgin.im/pidgin/main/rev/2948449ffd12
The purple_certificate_display_x509() function no longer exists in default.
It was changed in https://hg.pidgin.im/pidgin/main/rev/d65261e7426e
and then removed in https://hg.pidgin.im/pidgin/main/rev/cf4c54e487bc
I might check whether we should make datallah's change in the new code in
default.
--- a/ChangeLog Wed Jun 25 22:55:53 2014 -0700
+++ b/ChangeLog Mon Jul 07 23:08:09 2014 -0700
@@ -90,6 +90,9 @@
XMPP:
* Fix Facebook XMPP roster quirks. (#15041, #15957)
+ Yahoo:
+ * Fix login when using the GnuTLS library for TLS connections. (#16172)
+
version 2.10.9 (2/2/2014):
XMPP:
* Fix problems logging into some servers including jabber.org and
--- a/libpurple/certificate.h Wed Jun 25 22:55:53 2014 -0700
+++ b/libpurple/certificate.h Mon Jul 07 23:08:09 2014 -0700
@@ -697,7 +697,8 @@
*
* Retrieve a certificate from a pool.
*
- * Returns: Retrieved certificate, or NULL if it wasn't there
+ * Returns: Retrieved certificate (to be freed with
+ * purple_certificate_destroy), or NULL if it wasn't there
*/
PurpleCertificate *
purple_certificate_pool_retrieve(PurpleCertificatePool *pool, const gchar *id);
--- a/libpurple/plugins/ssl/ssl-gnutls.c Wed Jun 25 22:55:53 2014 -0700
+++ b/libpurple/plugins/ssl/ssl-gnutls.c Mon Jul 07 23:08:09 2014 -0700
@@ -473,11 +473,59 @@
if(s == GNUTLS_E_AGAIN || s == GNUTLS_E_INTERRUPTED) {
s = -1;
errno = EAGAIN;
+
#ifdef GNUTLS_E_PREMATURE_TERMINATION
} else if (s == GNUTLS_E_PREMATURE_TERMINATION) {
- purple_debug_warning("gnutls", "premature termination\n");
+ purple_debug_warning("gnutls", "Received a FIN on the TCP socket "
+ "for %s. This either means that the remote server closed "
+ "the socket without sending us a Close Notify alert or a "
+ "man-in-the-middle injected a FIN into the TCP stream. "
+ "Assuming it's the former.\n", gsc->host);
+#else
+ } else if (s == GNUTLS_E_UNEXPECTED_PACKET_LENGTH) {
+ purple_debug_warning("gnutls", "Received packet of unexpected "
+ "length on the TCP socket for %s. Among other "
+ "possibilities this might mean that the remote server "
+ "closed the socket without sending us a Close Notify alert. "
+ "Assuming that's the case for compatibility, however, note "
+ "that it's quite possible that we're incorrectly ignoing "
+ "a real error.\n", gsc->host);
+#endif
+ /*
+ * Summary:
+ * Always treat a closed TCP connection as if the remote server cleanly
+ * terminated the SSL session.
+ *
+ * Background:
+ * Most TLS servers send a Close Notify alert before sending TCP FIN
+ * when closing a session. This informs us at the TLS layer that the
+ * connection is being cleanly closed. Without this it's more
+ * difficult for us to determine whether the session was closed
+ * cleanly (we would need to resort to having the application layer
+ * perform this check, e.g. by looking at the Content-Length HTTP
+ * header for HTTP connections).
+ *
+ * There ARE servers that don't send Close Notify and we want to be
+ * compatible with them. And so we don't require Close Notify. This
+ * seems to match the behavior of libnss. This is a slightly
+ * unfortunate situation. It means a malicious MITM can inject a FIN
+ * into our TCP stream and cause our encrypted session to termiate
+ * and we won't indicate any problem to the user.
+ *
+ * GnuTLS < 3.0.0 returned the UNEXPECTED_PACKET_LENGTH error on EOF.
+ * GnuTLS >= 3.0.0 added the PREMATURE_TERMINATION error to allow us
+ * to detect the problem more specifically.
+ *
+ * For historical discussion see:
+ * https://developer.pidgin.im/ticket/16172
+ * http://trac.adiumx.com/intertrac/ticket%3A16678
+ * https://bugzilla.mozilla.org/show_bug.cgi?id=508698#c4
+ * http://lists.gnu.org/archive/html/gnutls-devel/2008-03/msg00058.html
+ * Or search for GNUTLS_E_UNEXPECTED_PACKET_LENGTH or
+ * GNUTLS_E_PREMATURE_TERMINATION
+ */
s = 0;
-#endif
+
} else if(s < 0) {
purple_debug_error("gnutls", "receive failed: %s\n",
gnutls_strerror(s));
--- a/libpurple/protocols/jabber/iq.c Wed Jun 25 22:55:53 2014 -0700
+++ b/libpurple/protocols/jabber/iq.c Mon Jul 07 23:08:09 2014 -0700
@@ -290,17 +290,19 @@
* be a valid match if any of the following is true:
* - Request 'to' matches reply 'from' (including the case where
* neither are set).
- * - Request 'to' was empty and reply 'from' is server JID.
+ * - Request 'to' was my JID (bare or full) and reply 'from' is empty.
* - Request 'to' was empty and reply 'from' is my JID. The spec says
* we should only allow bare JID, but we also allow full JID for
* compatibility with some servers.
+ * - Request 'to' was empty and reply 'from' is server JID. Not allowed by
+ * any spec, but for compatibility with some servers.
*
* These rules should allow valid IQ replies while preventing spoofed
* ones.
*
* For more discussion see the "Spoofing of iq ids and misbehaving
* servers" email thread from January 2014 on the jdev and security
- * mailing lists.
+ * mailing lists. Also see https://developer.pidgin.im/ticket/15879
*
* @return TRUE if this reply is valid for the given request.
*/
@@ -311,6 +313,12 @@
return TRUE;
}
+ if (!from && purple_strequal(to->node, js->user->node)
+ && purple_strequal(to->domain, js->user->domain)) {
+ /* Request 'to' was my JID (bare or full) and reply 'from' is empty */
+ return TRUE;
+ }
+
if (!to && purple_strequal(from->domain, js->user->domain)) {
/* Request 'to' is empty and reply 'from' domain matches our domain */