--- a/ChangeLog Wed Jul 09 11:42:34 2014 +0530
+++ b/ChangeLog Tue Oct 07 00:57:07 2014 +0530
@@ -1,6 +1,22 @@
Pidgin and Finch: The Pimpin' Penguin IM Clients That're Good for the Soul
version 3.0.0 (??/??/????):
+ * Various core components of libpurple are now GObjects (Ankit Vani). + * Ciphers are now built from the libpurple directory. + * Doxygen has been replaced by gtk-doc for generating documentation (Ankit + * Added dependency GPlugin, which is now required to build libpurple with + * Added dependency gobject-introspection, which is now required to enable + non-native plugin support. + * Specify a different set of encryption ciphers for TLS connections when + using GnuTLS. (elrond, belmyst, and Mark Doliner) (#8061) + * Don't allow SSL 3.0 (only TLS 1.0 and newer) for TLS connections when + using either GnuTLS or NSS. * Support building with the GTK+ 3.x toolkit. When configuring the
build, use --with-gtk=<2|3> to determine which toolkit to use. Using
@@ -76,23 +92,18 @@
* A single jabber plugin provides XMPP, GTalk and Facebook protocols.
* A single yahoo plugin provides both Yahoo and Yahoo JAPAN protocols.
+version 2.10.10 (?/?/?): - * Various core components of libpurple are now GObjects.- * Ciphers are now built from the libpurple directory.- * Added dependency GPlugin, which is now required to build libpurple with- * Added dependency gobject-introspection, which is now required to enable- non-native plugin support.- * Doxygen has been replaced by gtk-doc for generating documentation.-version 2.10.10 (?/?/?):+ * Allow and prefer TLS 1.2 and 1.1 when using libnss. (Elrond and libpurple3 compatibility:
* Encrypted account passwords are preserved until the new one is set.
* Fix loading Google Talk and Facebook XMPP accounts.
Windows-Specific Changes:
* Updates to dependencies:
- * NSS 3.16 and NSPR 4.10.4+ * NSS 3.17.1 and NSPR 4.10.7 * Fix build against Python 3. (Ed Catmur) (#15969)
@@ -319,7 +330,7 @@
this issue and suggesting solutions. (#15277)
* Updates to a number of dependencies, some of which have security
related fixes. Thanks again to Jacob Appelbaum and Jurre van Bergen
- for identifying the vulnerable libraries and to Dieter Verfaillie + for identifying the vulnerable libraries and to Dieter Verfaillie for helping getting the libraries updated. (#14571, #15285, #15286)
--- a/Makefile.mingw Wed Jul 09 11:42:34 2014 +0530
+++ b/Makefile.mingw Tue Oct 07 00:57:07 2014 +0530
@@ -33,12 +33,21 @@
GTK_INSTALL_VERSION = 2.24.18.0
+authenticode_sign = $(SIGNTOOL) sign \ + /f "$(SIGNTOOL_PFX)" /p "$(SIGNTOOL_PASSWORD)" \ + /d $(2) /du "https://pidgin.im" \ + /tr "http://timestamp.comodoca.com/rfc3161" /td SHA256 \ authenticode_sign = $(MONO_SIGNCODE) \
-spc "$(SIGNCODE_SPC)" -v "$(SIGNCODE_PVK)" \
-n "$(2)" -i "https://pidgin.im" \
-t "http://timestamp.verisign.com/scripts/timstamp.dll" -tr 10 \
gpg_sign = $(GPG_SIGN) -ab $(1) && $(GPG_SIGN) --verify $(1).asc
--- a/libpurple/plugins/ssl/ssl-gnutls.c Wed Jul 09 11:42:34 2014 +0530
+++ b/libpurple/plugins/ssl/ssl-gnutls.c Tue Oct 07 00:57:07 2014 +0530
@@ -44,7 +44,69 @@
static gnutls_certificate_client_credentials xcred = NULL;
#ifdef HAVE_GNUTLS_PRIORITY_FUNCS
-/* Priority strings. The default one is, well, the default (and is always+ * This string tells GnuTLS the list of ciphers we're ok with using. The goal + * is to disable weaker ciphers while remaining compatible with almost all + * Ideally this is something we wouldn't do. Ideally the system-wide GnuTLS + * library would use good defaults. But for now I think we can safely be more + * restrictive than the GnuTLS defaults. --Mark Doliner + * You can test the priority string using this command: + * > gnutls-cli --priority "<SIGNATURE STRING>" <HOSTNAME> + * Note that on Ubuntu 14.04 gnutls-cli is linked against the older GnuTLS + * 2.12.23, which might be different than what Pidgin is linked against. + * Rationale for this string: + * - Start with the SECURE192 keyword and add the SECURE128 keyword. This + * includes both 128 and 192 bit ciphers, giving priority to the 192 bit + * ciphers. We're not too picky about the order... people generally think + * 128 bit ciphers are sufficient for now and 192 bit ciphers are overkill + * (and slower), but the speed impact shouldn't matter much for us and we + * prefer to be resilient into the distant future. + * - Remove and re-add RSA ciphers. This gives them a lower priority. We do + * this because they don't support perfect forward secrecy (PFS) and we want + * ciphers that DO support PFS to have a higher priority. An alternate way + * to do this is to add +PFS to the front of the string, but the PFS keyword + * was only added in 3.2.4 and attempting to use it with older GnuTLS causes + * the entire priority string to be discarded. + * - Add SIGN-RSA-SHA1. SHA-1 is a weaker hashing algorithm that's not + * included in SECURE128. We'd prefer not to include it, but unfortunately + * as of 2014-09-10 it is required by login.live.com (used by the MSN PRPL). + * - Remove DHE-DSS ciphers. This is kind of arbitrary. We think maybe nobody + * uses these and all things being equal a shorter cipher list is preferred. + * - Disable SSL 3.0. Everyone should be using at least TLS 1.0 by now. + * We only use this string for GnuTLS 3.2.2 and newer. For older versions we + * use NORMAL. Over time the GnuTLS library has changed how it parses priority + * strings and there are some unfortunate quirks: + * - 128 bit ciphers stopped being included in the SECURE256 keyword in 3.0.9. + * - 256 bit ciphers started being included in the SECURE128 keyword in 3.0.12. + * - Support for combining priority string keywords wasn't added until 3.1.0. + * - Adding/removing items from the priority string using plus and minus is + * buggy in GnuTLS 3.2.2 and older. See this commit for details: + * https://gitorious.org/gnutls/gnutls/commit/913f03ccfafc37277f0a88287d02cdbb9bbfb652 + * These quirks make it difficult to find a single priority string that works + * well for all versions of GnuTLS that enables 128 and 256 bit ciphers while + * disabling less secure ciphers. In fact it's difficult to come up with ANY + * string that accomplishes this for 3.0.9, 3.0.10, and 3.0.11. And the bug + * with adding/removing items from the priority string means we might get + * unexpected results when using a complicated string, and so we're better off + * just sticking with the default. + * For more discussion about this change see bug #8061. +#define GNUTLS_DEFAULT_PRIORITY "SECURE192:+SECURE128:-RSA:+RSA:+SIGN-RSA-SHA1:-DHE-DSS:-VERS-SSL3.0" + * Priority strings. The default one is, well, the default (and is always * set). The hash table is of the form hostname => priority (both
@@ -63,6 +125,43 @@
purple_debug_misc("gnutls", "lvl %d: %s", level, str);
+ * set_cipher_priorities: + * @priority_cache: A pointer to a gnutls_priority_t. This will be initialized + * using the given priorities. + * @priorities: A GnuTLS priority string. + * A simple convenience wrapper around gnutls_priority_init(). The wrapper + * - Logs a helpful message if initialization fails. + * - Frees priority_cache if needed if initialization fails. + * - Set priority_cache to NULL if needed if initialization fails. +set_cipher_priorities(gnutls_priority_t *priority_cache, const char *priorities) + ret = gnutls_priority_init(priority_cache, priorities, NULL); + if (ret != GNUTLS_E_SUCCESS) { + purple_debug_warning("gnutls", "Unable to set cipher priorities to %s. " + "Error code %d: %s\n", priorities, ret, gnutls_strerror(ret)); + /* Versions of GnuTLS before 2.9.10 allocate but don't free priority_cache + if there's an error. We free it here to avoid a mem leak. */ + if (!gnutls_check_version("2.9.10")) { + gnutls_free(*priority_cache); + /* Versions of GnuTLS before 3.2.9 leave priority_cache pointing to + freed memory if there's an error. We want our callers to be able to + depend on this being NULL, so set it to NULL ourselves. */ + if (!gnutls_check_version("3.2.9")) { + *priority_cache = NULL; ssl_gnutls_init_gnutls(void)
@@ -143,16 +242,9 @@
if (default_priority_str) {
- if (gnutls_priority_init(&default_priority, default_priority_str, NULL)) {- purple_debug_warning("gnutls", "Unable to set default priority to %s\n",- /* Versions of GnuTLS as of 2.8.6 (2010-03-31) don't free/NULL- gnutls_free(default_priority);- default_priority = NULL;+ /* Note: If the string is invalid then this call will fail and + we'll try again with our default priority string later. */ + set_cipher_priorities(&default_priority, default_priority_str); g_free(default_priority_str);
@@ -161,12 +253,14 @@
#ifdef HAVE_GNUTLS_PRIORITY_FUNCS
- /* Make sure we set have a default priority! */+ /* Set a default priority string if we didn't do it above */ - if (gnutls_priority_init(&default_priority, "NORMAL:%SSL3_RECORD_VERSION", NULL)) {- /* See comment above about memory leak */- gnutls_free(default_priority);- gnutls_priority_init(&default_priority, "NORMAL", NULL);+ if (gnutls_check_version("3.2.2")) { + set_cipher_priorities(&default_priority, GNUTLS_DEFAULT_PRIORITY); + if (!default_priority) { + /* Try again with an extremely simple priority string. */ + set_cipher_priorities(&default_priority, "NORMAL"); #endif /* HAVE_GNUTLS_PRIORITY_FUNCS */
@@ -242,12 +336,12 @@
gnutls_data->handshake_handler = 0;
- purple_debug_error("gnutls", "Handshake failed. Error %s\n",+ purple_debug_error("gnutls", "Handshake failed: %s\n", if(gsc->error_cb != NULL)
gsc->error_cb(gsc, PURPLE_SSL_HANDSHAKE_FAILED,
--- a/libpurple/plugins/ssl/ssl-nss.c Wed Jul 09 11:42:34 2014 +0530
+++ b/libpurple/plugins/ssl/ssl-nss.c Tue Oct 07 00:57:07 2014 +0530
@@ -32,6 +32,9 @@
+/* WINDDK_BUILD is defined because the checks around usage of + * intrisic functions are wrong in nspr */ /* TODO: Why is this done?
@@ -133,6 +136,10 @@
+#if NSS_VMAJOR > 3 || ( NSS_VMAJOR == 3 && NSS_VMINOR >= 14 ) + SSLVersionRange supported, enabled; +#endif /* NSS >= 3.14 */ PR_Init(PR_SYSTEM_THREAD, PR_PRIORITY_NORMAL, 1);
@@ -150,6 +157,33 @@
SSL_CipherPrefSetDefault(SSL_DHE_RSA_WITH_DES_CBC_SHA, 1);
SSL_CipherPrefSetDefault(SSL_DHE_DSS_WITH_DES_CBC_SHA, 1);
+#if NSS_VMAJOR > 3 || ( NSS_VMAJOR == 3 && NSS_VMINOR >= 14 ) + /* Get the ranges of supported and enabled SSL versions */ + if ((SSL_VersionRangeGetSupported(ssl_variant_stream, &supported) == SECSuccess) && + (SSL_VersionRangeGetDefault(ssl_variant_stream, &enabled) == SECSuccess)) { + purple_debug_info("nss", "TLS supported versions: " + "0x%04hx through 0x%04hx\n", supported.min, supported.max); + purple_debug_info("nss", "TLS versions allowed by default: " + "0x%04hx through 0x%04hx\n", enabled.min, enabled.max); + /* Make sure SSL 3.0 is disabled (it's old and everyone should be + using at least TLS 1.0 by now), and make sure all versions of TLS + supported by the local library are enabled (for some reason NSS + doesn't enable newer versions of TLS by default -- more context in + if (enabled.min != SSL_LIBRARY_VERSION_TLS_1_0 || supported.max > enabled.max) { + enabled.max = supported.max; + if (SSL_VersionRangeSetDefault(ssl_variant_stream, &enabled) == SECSuccess) { + purple_debug_info("nss", "Changed allowed TLS versions to " + "0x%04hx through 0x%04hx\n", enabled.min, enabled.max); + purple_debug_error("nss", "Error setting allowed TLS versions to " + "0x%04hx through 0x%04hx\n", enabled.min, enabled.max); +#endif /* NSS >= 3.14 */ _identity = PR_GetUniqueIdentity("Purple");
_nss_methods = PR_GetDefaultIOMethods();
--- a/libpurple/win32/global.mak Wed Jul 09 11:42:34 2014 +0530
+++ b/libpurple/win32/global.mak Tue Oct 07 00:57:07 2014 +0530
@@ -25,7 +25,7 @@
JSON_GLIB_TOP ?= $(WIN32_DEV_TOP)/json-glib-0.14
LIBXML2_TOP ?= $(WIN32_DEV_TOP)/libxml2-2.9
MEANWHILE_TOP ?= $(WIN32_DEV_TOP)/meanwhile-1.0
-NSS_TOP ?= $(WIN32_DEV_TOP)/nss-3.14+NSS_TOP ?= $(WIN32_DEV_TOP)/nss-3.17.1-nspr-4.10.7 PERL_LIB_TOP ?= $(WIN32_DEV_TOP)/perl-5.10
SILC_TOOLKIT ?= $(WIN32_DEV_TOP)/silc-toolkit-1.1
TCL_LIB_TOP ?= $(WIN32_DEV_TOP)/tcl-8.5
