gaim/www

Parents e0902dd062c2
Children 59e5149f0315
this is the last time i explain at length why the passwords aren't
encrypted :-)
--- a/htdocs/faq.txt Tue Jul 22 14:08:02 2003 -0400
+++ b/htdocs/faq.txt Sat Aug 02 13:20:18 2003 -0400
@@ -795,6 +795,13 @@
the documentation on the "web of trust" model available at
http://www.gnupg.org/ and try out gaim-e.</p>
+!ANCHOR passwords
+Q: Why are the passwords in accounts.xml not encrypted?
+
+A: This is the case of a really long answer to a short question.
+See <a href="plaintextpasswords.txt">plaintextpasswords.txt</a> for an
+explaination.
+
Q: What is gaim-remote?
A: gaim-remote is a second executable included with Gaim starting with
--- /dev/null Thu Jan 01 00:00:00 1970 +0000
+++ b/htdocs/plaintextpasswords.txt Sat Aug 02 13:20:18 2003 -0400
@@ -0,0 +1,55 @@
+Gaim does not now and is not likely to encrypt the passwords in the
+accounts.xml file (in 0.65, .gaimrc was replaced by accounts.xml,
+prefs.xml, pounces.xml, and status.xml in order to make it easier to
+expand as Gaim grows more complex, to make some of our current efforts
+more possible, and some other reasons. The "why" of xml config files is
+not addressed here though. ), nor is it likely to be encrypted in a
+future release. This is somewhat controversial in Windows, esp. Windows
+98 (because of its weak file protections) but that's the way things are.
+
+The reasoning for this is multi-part.
+
+1) Instant messaging is not very secure, and it's kind of pointless to
+spend a lot of time adding protections onto the fairly strong file
+protections of unix (our native platform) when the protocols themselves
+aren't all that secure. The way to truly know who you are talking to is
+to use gaim-e on both ends (or a similar plugin, gaim-encryption would
+probably work as well), and use verified gpg keys. You shouldn't be
+using your instant messaging password for anything else, anyway -- while
+some protocols have decent password security, others are insufficient
+and some (like irc) don't have any at all.
+
+2) There are basically 4 approaches to password storage. A) Store a
+password(s) behind a password. Basically this means that we require you
+to type in some passphrase as Gaim starts in order to read the
+accounts.xml file, and, to be truely secure, require you to type it
+again if you write to it. Winicq does something very similar to this if
+you set it to its highest security settings. B) Obscure a password.
+This means we do something to store the password in some format other
+than plain text, but we automatically convert it for you. This is
+security by obscurity, and is a VERY Bad Thing(tm) in that it gives
+users a false sense of security; a false sense that we (as Gaim
+developers) believe would be worse to have than to let informed users
+deal with the password issue themselves. (Consider that a naive user
+might think that it is safe to share his or her accounts.xml, because
+the passwords are "encrypted".) C) Store the password in plain text and
+control access to the file. This is what Gaim does: the password is in
+accounts.xml in plain text, but the file itself is only readable by its
+owner. We allow the user to determine under what conditions sensitive
+files should be opened (if at all), and what constitutes a breach of
+security (for instance opening the file before you realize what's up
+with it), and to react accordingly. ICQ is the ony protocol that will
+allow the account to be completely taken over by surprise, and that only
+because of flaws in the server that allow accounts to be highjacked _at
+the server_ w/out the use of a client at all. D) Lastly, you can not
+store passwords at all. This is Gaim's default, and by far the most
+secure of all of the options.
+
+If you really wanted to, you could write a script to wrap Gaim that
+would decrypt accounts.xml and re-encrypt it when Gaim exists. You
+wouldn't be able to encrypt it while Gaim is running, because Gaim
+writes to accounts.xml for things like info change. This would minimize
+your exposure time unless (like me) you run Gaim nearly 24/7.
+Personally, I feel that on any decent os (unix), if someone can get to
+your files you should either be able to trust the person to not touch
+them, or you shouldn't be storing sensitive information there at all.